Philosophy Quiz 1 - ProProfs Quiz
branches of philosophy. Philosophy Quizzes & Trivia. Branches of philosophy Metaphysics. Existentialism. Ethics. Ontology. Number of Questions: All, 1, 2, 3 Are You The Type Of Person Who Cheats In A Relationship?. What is the difference between metaphysics and epistemology? 10 Question Sample Quiz socialgamenews.info; Tallahassee Community College; PHI - Fall Ethics Quiz 1. Description (1) Being: Metaphysics - The study of the nature of reality (2) Thinking: Epistemology - The study of knowledge. (3) Doing: Concerned with human beings in relationship to a supernatural being.
The neatest and most ingenious was the a priori argument of St. God necessarily exists, because the idea of God is the idea of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. This is the argument later known as the ontological proof.
In describing oneself or the world as contingent, one means only that the thing in question does not exist through itself alone; it owes its being to the activity of some other thing, as a person owes his being to his parents. Contingent things are not self-complete; they each demand the existence of something else if they are to be explained. Thus, the move is made from contingent to necessary being; it is felt that contingent things, of whatever order, cannot be endlessly dependent on other contingent things but must presuppose a first cause that is self-complete and so exists necessarily.
In Hegel the necessary being is not a separate existent but, as it were, an order of things; the loose facts of everyday life and even of science are said to point to a system that is all-embracing and in which everything is necessarily what it is.
The principle of the argument, however, is unchanged despite the change in the conclusion. To say that something exists is not to specify a concept further but to claim that it has an instance; it cannot be discovered whether a concept has an instance by merely inspecting it.
The first cause argument, it was contended, suffers from two fatal weaknesses. Even if it is correct in its assertion that contingent being presupposes necessary being, it cannot identify the necessary being in question with God as happened in each of the Thomistic proofs without resurrecting the ontological argument. If it is true, as supporters of the causal proof suppose, that God alone can answer the description of a necessary being, then whatever exists necessarily is God and whatever is God exists necessarily.
Modern supporters of the causal proof have tried to meet this objection by saying that the equivalence is one of concepts, not of concept and existent; the existence of a necessary being is already established in the first part of the argument, and the equivalence in the second part of the argument is between the concept of necessary being and the concept of God.
In other words, they distinguish between existence and essence. In the first part of the argument, the existence of a necessary being is proved; in the second part of the argument, the essence of that necessary being is identified with what men call God. Beyond this first contended weakness, however, there are grave difficulties in the move from contingent to necessary existence.
Things in the experienced world are causally related, and some account of this relationship can be given in terms of the temporal relations of events; causal relations hold primarily between kinds of events, and a cause is, at least, a regular antecedent of a specific kind of effect. But when an attempt is made to extend the notion of causality from a relationship that holds within experience to one that connects the experienced world as a whole to something that falls wholly outside it, there is no longer anything firm on which to hold.
The activities of God cannot precede happenings in the world because God is, by definition, not in time; and how the relationship is to be understood in these circumstances becomes highly problematic.
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Some metaphysicians, like some recent theologians, seek to evade the difficulty by saying that God is not the cause of the world but its ground, or again by distinguishing causes of becoming, which are temporal, from a cause of being, which is not. It is doubtful whether these moves do more than restate the problem in different terms. The argument from design is itself a form of causal argument and accordingly suffers from all the difficulties mentioned above, together with some of its own, as Hume and Kant both point out.
Even on its own terms it is wrong to conclude the existence of a Creator rather than an architect.
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Furthermore, it infers that the being in question has unlimited powers, when all that the evidence seems to warrant is that its powers are very great. The unbroken reign of law throughout natural evolution is impressive, but as a line of reasoning it does not seem to bear close examination.
The ontological proof, in particular, has won renewed attention from thinkers such as Norman Malcolma philosopher strongly influenced by Wittgenstein, and Charles Hartshornean American Realist whose form of theism is called panentheism the doctrine of a God who has an unchanging essence but who completes himself in an advancing experience. Increasingly, however, philosophers of religion are preoccupied not with these metaphysical abstractions but with the status and force of actual religious claims.
The soulmindand body The soul—body relationship As well as believing in the reality of Forms, Plato believed in the immortality of the human soul. Ideally the soul should rule and guide the body, and it could ensure that this situation persisted by seeing that the bodily appetites were indulged to the minimum extent necessary for the continuance of life.
The true philosopher, as Plato put it in the Phaedomade his life a practice for death because he knew that after death the soul would be free of bodily ties and would return to its native element. A theory of this kind was worked out but not taken to its logical conclusion by Aristotle in his treatise De anima On the Soul. Aristotle defined soul in terms of functions. The soul of a plant was concerned with nutrition and reproduction, that of an animal with these and with sensation and independent movement, that of a man with all these and with rational activity.
The soul was, in each case, the form of some body, and the clear implication of this was that it would disappear as the body in question dissolved. To be more accurate, the soul was the principle of life in something material; it needed the material element to exist, although it was not itself either material or immaterial but, to put it crudely, an abstraction. Even though Aristotle wasclearly committed by everything he said in the earlier parts of the De anima to the view that the soul is not anything substantial, he nevertheless distinguished toward the end of this work between what he called the active and the passive intellects and spoke of the former in Platonic terms.
The mind—body relationship In more recent metaphysics less has been heard of the soul and more of the mind; the old problem of the relationship of soul and body is now that of the relationship of mind and body. Most, if not all, subsequent discussion of this subject has been affected by the thinking of Descartes. In his Meditationes de Prima Philosophia ; Meditations on First Philosophyhe argued that there was a total and absolute distinction between mental and material substance.
The defining characteristic of matter was to occupy space; the defining characteristic of mind was to be conscious or, in a broad sense of the term, to think. Material substance was, so to speak, all one, although packets of it were more or less persistent; mental substance existed in the form of individual minds, with God as the supreme example. The mental and the material orders were each complete in themselves, under God; it was this fact that made it appropriate for him to use the technical term substance in this context: The logical consequence of this view, drawn by some later Cartesians, was that there can be no interaction between mind and body; all causality is immanent, within one order or the other, and any appearance of mind affecting body or of body affecting mind must be explained as the result of a special intervention by God, who, on the occasion of changes in one substance, brings it about that there are corresponding changes in the other.
Descartes himself, however, had no sympathy with this view, which was called occasionalism. Mind could affect body and vice versa because mind and body had a specially close relationship, which was particularly evident in the aspects of conscious life that have to do with sensation, imagination, and emotion as opposed to pure thought.
It was possible, he believed, to doubt the existence of his body what was certain was only that he had the experience of having a body, and this might be illusory but not the existence of his mind, for the very act of doubting was itself mental. That mind existed was evident from the immediate testimony of consciousness; that body existed was something that needed an elaborate proof, involving his doctrine of clear and distinct ideas and his attempt to establish the existence of a God who is no deceiver.
Apart from this, Descartes appealed to arguments of a broadly Platonic type to bring out what was truly distinctive about mind. He admitted that sensation and imagination could be understood only if referred to the mind—body complex but contended that acts of the pure intellect and of will here his thought was influenced by that of St.
Augustine, the great 5th-century Christian thinker belonged to the mind as it was in itself. Descartes did not claim to have a philosophical proof of the immortality of the soul—that, in his view, required the assurance of revelation—but he did think that his theory prepared the way for that doctrine by establishing the separate existence of mind. Hobbes argued that nothing existed but matter in motion; there was no such thing as mental substance, only material substance.
A generation later Spinoza was to refashion the whole Cartesian metaphysics on bold lines.
In place of the two distinct substances, each complete in itself yet each liable to external interference should God will it, Spinoza posited a single substance, God or Nature, possessed of infinite attributes, of which the mental and the material alone are known to men.
Whatever manifested itself under one attribute had its counterpart in all the others. It followed from this that to every mental event there was a precisely corresponding physical event, and vice versa.
A man was thus not a mysterious union of two different elements but a part of the one substance that, like all other parts, manifested itself in different ways under different attributes. Spinoza did not explain why it was that physical events could be correlated with mental events in the case of a human being but not in that of, for example, a stone.
His theory of psycho-physical parallelismhowever, has persisted independently of his general metaphysics and has found supporters even in modern times. One way in which Spinoza threw fresh light on the mind—body problem was in calling attention to the influence of the body on the mind and in taking seriously the suggestion that they be treated as a single unit.
In this respect, his work on the subject was far in advance of the Empiricist philosophers of the next century. Nor did Kant make much, if any, advance in this particular direction, convinced as he was of the necessity of accepting an empirical dualism of mind and body. It was left to Hegel and the Idealists to look at the problem afresh and to bring out the way in which mental life and bodily life are intimately bound together.
The accounts of action and cognition given by T. Green and Bradley, and more recently by R. Collingwood, are altogether more enlightening than those of Empiricist contemporaries just because they rest on a less dogmatic basis and a closer inspection of fact. No metaphysical problem is discussed today more vigorously than that of mind and body. Three main positions are held. First, there are still writers e. Lewis in his work The Elusive Mind  who think that Descartes was substantially right: The testimony of consciousness is invoked as the main support of this conclusion; it is alleged that all men know themselves to be what they are, or at least who they are, apart from their bodily lives; it is alleged again that their bodily lives present themselves as experiences—i.
The existence of mind, as Descartes claimed, is certain, that of body dubious and perhaps not strictly provable. Second, there are writers such as Gilbert Ryle who would like to take the Aristotelian theory to its logical conclusion and argue that mind is nothing but the form of the body. Mind is not, as Descartes supposed, something accessible only to its owner; it is rather something that is obvious in whatever a person does.
To put it crudely, mind is simply behaviour. Strawson is a typical example. To this end they try to assert that the true unit is neither mind nor body but the person.
A person is something that is capable of possessing physical and mental predicates alike. How they can be the same, however, has not so far been explained by supporters of this view.
According to this view, a human being is a body among bodies but is, as Plato said, self-moving as material things are not. That this should be so—that human beings are possessed of wills and can in favourable circumstances act freely—is taken as an ultimate fact neither requiring nor capable of explanation. It is often denied that any scientific discovery could give rational grounds for questioning this fact.
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It is also stressed that the causality of a human being is fundamentally different from that of a natural subject, intentional action being quite other than mere behaviour determined from without. Connected with these topics is the problem, much discussed in recent philosophy as a result of the rise of cybernetics, of what differentiates men from machines.
Two answers used to be given: Now, however, there exist machines whose calculating abilities far surpass those of any human being; such machines may not literally think, but they certainly arrive at conclusions.
Furthermore, it is not true that their operations are of a purely routine nature: These facts suggest that the gap between minds and machines is less wide than it has often been thought to be; they do not, however, destroy it altogether. Lucasa British philosopher, has argued, human beings have the ability to diagnose and correct their own limitations in a way to which there is no parallel in machines.
As some older philosophers put it, man is a being with the power of self-transcendence; he can work within a system, but he can also move to another level and so see the shortcomings of the system. A machine can only work within a system; it operates according to rules but cannot change them of its own accord.
Finally, mention should be made of an extreme Materialist solution to the mind—body problem: Supporters of this theory agree that the two are separate in idea but argue that physiology shows that despite this they are contingently identical.
What seems to be a state of mind, above all to its possessor, is really a state of the brain, and mind is thus reduced to matter after all. It is not clear, however, why physiologists should be granted the last word on a topic like this, and, even if it were agreed that they should be, the correlations so far established between mental occurrences and states of the brain are at best sketchy and incomplete.
Most likely you would mention both your intuition and your experience to help you justify why you think you are human. There have been philosophers who believe that your intuition that you are human is a valid form of knowledge, while others would disagree. Others believe that what is true must be determined by experience, like what can be scientifically proven.
Why is epistemology interesting to philosophers? One reason is that it helps us to more thoroughly define what is true and even question if we can know that something is definitely, absolutely true. A different branch of philosophy deals with a related question: The study of reality is known as metaphysics. It focuses on determining what, if anything, can be said to be real. At this point, you might wonder whether there is really a difference between what is true and what is real.
In philosophy, the terms do mean different things, even though we use them interchangeably in everyday life. What is true has to do with what beliefs we can justify, while what is real is about all of existence.
A question related to metaphysics and what is real is: How can we know whether souls exist? Can human beings ever know whether there is a God? His ontology is hard to describe in its specifics, but for starters, like many philosophers, he sees a deep split between reality and language.
Language separates the world into all sorts of different parts and categories, but those categories are little more than useful fictions. The fictions, though are real—real stories about fictional categories. Or, in other words, everything we can say about reality is fictional, but language itself is a reality of its own. You are a soul. You have a body. Lewis, probably comes from a Quaker magazine in the s. It argues for a very particular ontological perspective: Bodies, on the other hand, do belong to that category.